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Abstract— Trilateration has recently become one of the well-
known threat models to the user's location privacy in location-
based applications (aka: location-based services or LBS), 
especially those containing highly sensitive information such as 
dating applications. The threat model mainly depends on the 
distance shown from the targeted victim to the adversary to 
pinpoint the victim's position. As a countermeasure, most of 
location-based applications have already implemented the "hide 
distance" function to protect their user's location privacy. The 
effectiveness of such approach however is still questionable. 
Therefore, in this paper, we first investigate how popular 
location-based dating applications are currently protecting their 
user's privacy by testing the two most popular GLBT-focused 
applications: Jack'd and Grindr. As one of our findings, we then 
demonstrate how an adversary can still figure out the location of 
the targeted victim even when the "hide distance" function is 
enabled. Our threat model is simply an enhanced version of the 
trilateration model. Without using sophisticated hacking tools or 
complex attack techniques, the model is still very effective and 
efficient at locating the targeted victim, and of course in a so-
called "legal" manner since we only utilize the information that 
can be obtained just as same as any other ordinary user. In 
addition, we also introduce a potential side channel attack 
fashion due to the current design of Jack’d. Our study thus raises 
an urgent alarm to those location-based applications’ users in 
general, and especially to those GLBT-focused dating 
application's users about their privacy. Finally, the paper 
concludes by suggesting some possible solutions from the 
viewpoints of both the provider and the user considering the 
implementation cost and the trade-off of utility. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, thanks to the advancement of Global 
Positioning System (GPS), most of current smart phones have 
a built-in GPS receiver, which helps to estimate the location 
information with accuracy up to just a few meters. Taking this 
advantage, location-based applications are getting more 
dominant in the smart phone applications market. Just a 
decade ago, one still had to use paper map, or ask for direction 
when going to an unknown area; while young people were 
surfing around online chat rooms to look for friends at that 
time. However, the introduction of LBSs has changed our 
lifestyle and the way that people interact with each other 
thanks to its undeniable convenience. For instance, one can 
easily find the nearest restaurant, convenience store or 
shopping mall by using application like Google Map; or hang 
out with friends by using application like Find My Friends, etc. 
A. Privacy in General 
Nevertheless, in the era of Information and Communication 
Technology, along with censorship and massive surveillance 
in cyberspace, the problem of information leakage has also 
become more and more severe. Tim Cook, the CEO of Apple 
Inc., used to say at the White House Cyber Security Summit in 
early 2015 that: "Privacy is a matter of life and death". As 
people increasingly keep more sensitive personal information 
in their phone, big agencies and companies like Apple have 
been working hard to provide the best protection to their 
customer’s private information. However, an absolute privacy 
and a completely perfect countermeasure for preventing future 
data breaches still remain as headache matters. According to 
the Tenth Annual Cost of Data Breach Study published by 
IBM in 2015, the average consolidated total cost of a data 
breach is $3.8 million, increasing 23% since 2013. The report 
also points out that the cost incurred for each lost or stolen 
record that has sensitive and confidential information 
increased 6% from a consolidated average of $145 to $154 [1]. 
Among personally identifiable information, location is 
considered as one of the most essential factors since the leak 
of location information can later lead to the disclosure of other 
sensitive private information such as occupation, hobbies, 
daily routines, social relationships [14]. In spite of many 
attack techniques [5], [11] that have been studied by the 
research community since then, the protection of location 
privacy from both LBS provider side and user side has not 
been sufficiently and appropriately taken into account. Thus, 
in this paper, we investigate the current status of location 
privacy preserving in popular GLBT-focused dating apps to 
have a clearer view, and observe how it is being protected in 
real-life practice with both already-known threat model and its 
enhanced version. 
B. Privacy Concerns in GLBT-focused Apps 
It is important to emphasize that it is not because of hatred 
or discrimination that makes us opt for investigating GLBT-
focused applications like Jack'd and Grindr. But, because of 
their popularity, possession of highly-sensitive information, 
and the huge number of users
1
 that make the apps highly 
vulnerable to cyber-attack just as same as the case of Ashley 
Madison [3]. In addition, it is also because GLBT-focused 
dating applications like Grindr and Jack’d are location 
sensitive, and their users depend on the publicly shown 
distance information to look for nearby people to meet up 
right away, thus potentially exposed to the risk of being 
located. 
As stated in [12], there are still many Islamic nations where 
homosexuality carries the death penalty. For instance, there 
were several gay men in Syria lured by ISIS terrorists to go 
out on dates, and later executed publicly by stoning as recently 
reported in [4]. Even in those regions like North America and 
Western Countries, which are thought to be more open-
minded, the GLBT community is still not widely accepted. 
More or less, people belong to the GLBT community are still 
facing the problem of being attacked, harassed or 
discriminated. Such cases show that protecting privacy of 
GLBT-focused application's user is a nontrivial task, and 
should not be neglected by the LBS providers. Because the 
location information together with other information such as 
height, weight, age, hobbies can be employed to accurately 
disclose the targeted individuals. Later, the compromised 
information from those victims such as frequently visiting 
place, occupation, address, daily routines and social 
relationships can be used to intimidate for money, or even lead 
to physical harassment. At this point, things become 
understandable why Tim Cook says: "Privacy is a matter of 
life and death" since he also came out as gay in October 2014. 
C. Organization 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We will 
introduce our experimental environment in the last part of this 
section. In Section II, Grindr and Jack'd are investigated in 
terms of location privacy. We will demonstrate how the user's 
location can be accurately discovered even when approaches 
like location anonymization have been implemented. In 
Section III, other privacy concerns are discussed. Additionally, 
we introduce a side channel attack fashion that can be 
conducted due to current design of Jack'd. Finally, from the 
viewpoints of both LBS provider and user, we then give some 
possible solutions, and conclude the paper in Section IV. 
D. Experiment Setup 
The trilateration threat model actually can be conducted in 
a physical way that the adversary carries his device around to 
three different places and notes down the distances shown 
from himself to the victim. However, in order to have an 
easily manageable experimental environment, we employ 
three virtual machines that host Android OS to play the role of 
adversaries. Each machine is then set to be in positions as 
following: 
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 According to Grindr, the app has around two million daily active users [8], 
while Jack’d has 5 million users as of 2014 with more than two million active 
users [10]. 
 Victim is an account run on a real iPhone 5, locates at 
Science Frontier Laboratory, Kyoto University with 
coordinates (35.02350485, 135.77687703). 
 Adversary A1 is located at Demachi-yanagi Station 
with coordinates (35.03051251, 135.77327415). 
 Adversary A2 is located at Heian Shrine with 
coordinates (35.01598257, 135.78242585). 
 Adversary A3 is located at Kyoto Imperial Palace with 
coordinates (35.02258561, 135.76493382). 
Each Android machine is then equipped with Fake-GPS so 
that their positions can be freely set to any corner of the world. 
Next, to capture packets in Subsection III.A, we use Microsoft 
Network Monitor version 3.4. All of the maps used in this 
study are drawn by using a free map tool available at: 
http://obeattie.github.io/gmaps-radius/. 
II. LOCATION PRIVACY CONCERN 
A. Trilateration Model 
To the best of our knowledge, the trilateration threat model 
is allegedly said to be first reported to Grindr in 2014 [9], and 
discussed in recent studies [5] and [11]. The main idea of this 
attack model bases on the distance from the user, which is 
publicly shown to other users. With privilege no more than an 
ordinary user, an adversary just needs to move around the 
victim to three different places. Distances from the victim to 
the adversary at those three positions are then used to pinpoint 
the exact location of the victim. As shown in Figure 1, Grindr 
user, who opts for showing his distance, is facing high risk of 
being located since the adversary can obtain accuracy up to 
the victim’s building as highlighted in the red rectangle. This 
threat model works totally the same with Jack’d. 
 
Figure 1. Testing Trilateration Threat Model in Grindr 
From the geometry point of view, the location of the victim 
is nothing else but the coordinates of V, which is the solution 
      of a system of simultaneous circle equations. 
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Where: 
                               are latitudes and 
longitudes of the adversary at three different 
positions          respectively. 
          are distances from V to           
respectively. 
In response to this type of attack, Grindr adopted a function 
in which the user can opt to hide the distance since August 
2014 [7]. Thus, the threat of trilateration model is disabled to 
locate those users who already enabled the “hide distance” 
function. As we revisited [9] at the time of writing this paper, 
the map was no longer able to pinpoint Grindr users as shown 
in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Previous Grindr's flaw had been fixed. 
B. Your Neighbors are My Spies 
Despite of the fact that one of the best solutions to protect 
the location information is not to publish it; in this part, as a 
key point of this paper, we will illustrate an enhanced version 
of the trilateration threat model that current approach like 
location anonymization implemented by enabling the "hide 
distance" function still cannot effectively counter to. The 
primary factor in success of this threat is based on the way 
that Grindr arranges its users on the screen. Perhaps, in order 
to maintain the utility, users are displayed left-to-right and 
top-to-down in an ascending order of their distances 
regardless of whether they have disabled the "show distance" 
function or not. By exploiting this fact, the neighbors 
displayed just before and just behind the victim 
unintentionally become the upper and lower bounds of the 
distance from the victim to the adversary. As a result, the 
region in which the victim is locating is easily obtained by 
employing the trilateration model again, but with two circles 
drawing from the adversary to the two nearest neighbors as 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Enhanced version of Trilateration Threat Model 
By using this threat model, the adversary even does not 
need to query the victim profile several times to note down the 
distance as done with the original trilateration model, but still 
very effective at locating the victim's region as marked in 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. The victim’s region is smoothly bounded. 
A lesson learned from Figure 3 and Figure 4 is that the 
adversary gains more location information about the victim at 
A2 and A3 than A1 because the bounds set by the pairs of 
victim's neighbors from the viewpoints of A2 and A3 are more 
narrow than from A1. Therefore, even without drawing the 
pair circles from A1, the adversary can still confidently infer 
the possible region of the victim, because one of the two 
intersection areas is a river space, thus the probability that the 
victim is locating in that region is relatively low. 
To this point, one may think that this type of attack model 
will not work with those victims who locate in low-density 
area since there are not so many neighbors around him for this 
attack model to take place. However, as far as we are 
concerned, using the term "victim's neighbors" actually is not 
always correct, because physically they may not locate near to 
the victim. In fact, this attack model is still valid as long as the 
following condition holds: 
AN1 < AV < AN2 
Where: 
 AV is distance from the adversary to the victim. 
 AN1 and AN2 are distances from the adversary to the 
pair of so-called victim's nearest neighbors. 
Thus, in real life attack, the adversary can also apply this 
model to attack the victim in remote area by placing himself in 
the middle of high-density areas and the victim's region as 
shown in Figure 5. The more crowded the urban areas are, the 
more resources that the adversary can possess to precisely 
explore the victim's location. Or in a more active attack 
fashion, the adversary can create two colluding accounts and 
move them around until he can satisfactorily compromise the 
victim's location. The key idea is to gradually reduce the 
subtraction value of |AN1-AN2| such that V is still 
sandwiched by N1 and N2 on the display screen of the 
adversary. The smaller the subtraction value becomes, the 
more accurate location of the victim can be revealed. 
 
Figure 5. The "Victim's neighbors" are not necessarily close to him. 
Up to this point, it is obvious that obtaining victim's real 
location from Figure 4 becomes a trivial task. Moreover, with 
this enhanced model, even when all local members hide their 
distances, the adversary can still make complete use of his 
colluding accounts to infer, thus be able to narrow down the 
possible region in which the victim is locating. 
III. OTHER PRIVACY CONCERNS 
A. Vulnerabilities from Third-Party Advertisement Banner 
and Misconduct in Handling User's Personal 
Information 
In the age of online marketing, one's privacy is often 
threatened by the very advertisements popping up in his 
device as mentioned in [2]. In order to investigate this issue in 
Jack’d and Grindr, we analyze packets captured while using 
these two applications. The results are shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Information Leakage through Third-Party Ads 
Surprisingly, in both applications, the third-party 
advertisements leak many important information of the users 
including name of Telecommunications Service Provider (i.e., 
KDDI), device's model information (i.e., iPhone 5), country 
code (i.e., JP), and last but not least: the application name (i.e., 
Grindr, Jack) which is the most sensitive information that no 
any straight-acting person wants the others to know the 
existence of such applications in his phone. It may have no 
problem if the packets are sent directly to the ads provider's 
server. However, what is worth mentioning here is that the 
packets are sent in an unencrypted fashion, thus widely open 
to an attack type known as man-in-the-middle attack, in which 
the hacker taps the Internet connection of the victim to 
eavesdrop the packets.  
By analyzing all the captured packets, we were further 
shocked by the fact that all the packets containing members' 
profile pictures of Grindr are also sent in the air without 
encryption, thus being captured and converted into the original 
image files as shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Pictures recovered from unencrypted packets 
Concerning ethical issue, we only recover image files that 
appear on the first screen page of Grindr as evidence, and the 
users' avatars are intentionally censored.  Taking into account 
of the above findings, it is obvious that the user's privacy is 
not guaranteed at all regardless of the fact that the vendor has 
been alerted to these issues by a security firm before [9]. 
B. Together with IP Spy and Linkage Attack 
As human being is born curious, social engineering 
intrusion techniques like phishing is always the easiest but 
effective way to compromise people. Since Jack'd provides it 
users with a feature to see who viewed his profile with exact 
timestamp, an adversary may put an IP-spy URL into his 
profile to promote his appearance, thus being able to obtain 
the victim's IP address if the victim feels curious and click on 
that URL. Nevertheless, it was discussed in [13] that IP 
address is also important personal information which can be 
exploited to perform the linkage attack to retrieve other related 
personal information. To have a clearer view on how this trick 
is really effective at luring innocent users, we place our Jack'd 
accounts in three big cities of Japan which are Tokyo, Osaka 
and Kyoto within 12 hours (from 6PM to 6AM of the 
following day) to estimate how many innocent and curious 
victims could be lured. We choose this time period because it 
is the most active usage time according to [6]. To conduct this 
task, we need to reboot the virtual machines every 2 hours so 
that our accounts will not be disappeared from the screen of 
other local users, because we found that Jack'd only keeps an 
account displayed on other user’s screen for 2 hours since the 
latest login. The result is illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Analysis from IP-spy Intrusion Technique 
In total, we got 131 viewers from three accounts with 41 
viewers clicked on the IP-spy URL that we put in our profile. 
 
Figure 9. Linkage Attack with IP-spy and Jack'd timestamp 
Among these 41 clicks, we were able to perform linkage 
attack to 26 users with high confidence by matching the 
timestamp between Jack'd and our IP-spy server to further 
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Tokyo 10 10 14 9
Osaka 10 21 8 4
Kyoto 10 24 8 3
Tokyo-click 1 2 2 2
Osaka-click 9 8 3 3
Kyoto-click 3 6 2 0
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reveal other information including their IP address, ISP, 
display language and platform of their devices as shown in 
Figure 9. 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Through this study, we would like to particularly alert the 
users of Grindr and Jack'd as well as the users of other LBSs 
in general about the risk of being located easily regardless of 
whether the recent location anonymization approach has been 
adopted. By investigating these two apps, we found a paradox 
that although there have been many attack models proposed 
by the privacy-preserving researchers, the user’s location 
privacy has not been seriously taken into consideration by 
both LBS provider and the users themselves. As far as we are 
concerned, the reason of this negligence comes from both 
LBS provider and user. From the viewpoint of LBS provider, 
it might cause overhead to implement those sophisticated 
solutions proposed by the research community, while the 
utility of the app is not really guaranteed, thus probably lead 
to the loss of its customer. From the viewpoint of the user, it 
may be because of two reasons. Perhaps, the first one is also 
due to the trade-off of utility. The other one is because of 
unawareness. For that reason, instead of using complicated 
mathematical equations and complex algorithms to show the 
threat model, we opt for visualizing it on map in this paper so 
that even those non-technical readers can understand how 
easily their privacy can be compromised in the current 
security condition. 
In order to manage risks of man-in-the-middle attack, IP 
spy and other side channel attacks as mentioned in Section III, 
we urge the LBS providers and involved third-parties to 
carefully encrypt the connection from their servers to the users. 
For the user side, we suggest not opening any URL out of 
curiosity. If it is really necessary to open an unknown URL, 
the user should turn on VPN at first to prevent the leak of their 
real IP address. 
For those threat models discussed in Section II, let us argue 
that privacy preserving policy is different from person to 
person. Especially in GLBT community, some already came 
out, thus have no concern about privacy; while some are 
straight-acting, thus do not want to be disclosed. Therefore, a 
centralized solution is not really suitable, and users are the 
very ones who need to make decision whether to protect their 
own privacy. For the meantime, while waiting for the experts 
and the LBS providers to discover a perfect solution for 
location privacy protection without trading off the utility of 
LBS, we suggest that the user should take a step forward to 
protect them from those vulnerabilities mentioned in this 
study. That is to use exactly the Fake-GPS applications like 
the one that we use in our experiment (probably also used by 
most of the adversaries) to hide the real location to an 
acceptable extent so that the user can still gain the 
convenience provided by the LBS. How far the fake location 
should be shifted from the real one depends on how much 
utility that a user is willing to trade off with his privacy, thus it 
is different from case by case. We strongly believe that this 
user-centric solution not only suits all type of users, but also 
helps to save the vendors from overhead investment in 
implementing sophisticated solutions and infrastructures.  
Apart from aforementioned technical methods, human 
factor is also important in protecting oneself in the cyberspace. 
In order to avoid troublesome problems in the future when the 
vendors get hacked as the case of Ashley Madison [3], the 
user should not register account to those highly sensitive apps 
under his real name or even a part of his real name. Instead, 
the user should use information that could not be used to link 
the account with his real-life personally identifiable 
information. 
Last but not least, in this paper, we of course could have 
utilized higher techniques to extract and test the threat model’s 
accuracy with more users of Jack'd and Grindr in bulk. 
However, as far as we are concerned with the ethical issue that 
those compromised users also have their right to be 
undisclosed, and there may be our acquaintances among them. 
We thus did not go beyond those accounts created by 
ourselves. 
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